Construction policy research: beware reason masquerading as truth by John-Paul Smiley (1254147) et al.
Smiley, J, Dainty, A and Fernie, S (2014) Construction policy research: Beware reason masquerading 
as truth  In: Raiden, A B and Aboagye-Nimo, E (Eds) Procs 30th Annual ARCOM Conference, 1-3 
September 2014, Portsmouth, UK, Association of Researchers in Construction Management, 1081-
1090. 
CONSTRUCTION POLICY RESEARCH: BEWARE 
REASON MASQUERADING AS TRUTH 
John-Paul Smiley1, Andrew Dainty and Scott Fernie 
1 School of Civil and Building Engineering, Loughborough University, Leicestershire, LE11 3TU, UK 
One of the defining characteristics of the modern era has been the ascendency and 
privileging of an instrumental version of reason at the expense of other, competing 
forms of rationality. Now deeply established and an integral component of Neoliberal 
discourse, it forms the dominant form of reasoning for many planners, policy-makers, 
academics and laypersons alike. Drawing on the works of Max Horkheimer and Max 
Weber, this paper considers the ways in which instrumental reason diminishes policy 
formulations and undermines democratic culture. It achieves this through a 
consideration of the exclusion of ‘deep’ green activists from policy formulation and 
an examination of the Capital approach to sustainability popularised by David Pearce. 
Recognising instrumental reason as a culturally specific value-laden ideal, this paper 
teases out the assumptions behind such thought and highlights the potential for 
alternatives. Such a realisation has important consequences, as the ability for built 
environment policy-makers to reimagine theory and practice becomes possible only 
when the veil of instrumental reason, cloaked and presented as a value-neutral ideal, 
is lifted. It is hoped that such a perspective will contribute to the growing theoretical 
and philosophical debate in Construction Management research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the defining characteristics of the modern era has been the ascendency and 
privileging of an instrumental version of reason at the expense of other, competing 
forms of rationality. A reaction against the perceived deficiencies of pre-
enlightenment thought dominated by religion and tradition, an instrumental form of 
rationality was seen by many, somewhat ironically perhaps, as a saviour and salvation 
for humankind. It was thought to be the light that would illuminate the darkness in the 
hearts and minds of the masses. But, as came to be recognised, an instrumental reason, 
wholly isolated from some additional form of religious, philosophical, or ethical 
rationale risks treating human life as a means to an end rather than an end in itself, 
thus diminishing its value in the process. Max Weber (1904) lamented the rise of 
instrumental reason in modernity and believed it to be responsible for the 
‘disenchantment’ of society, with scientism and bureaucracy replacing long-held 
beliefs and considered to remove any sense of magic or mystery from social life. More 
recently, Zygmunt Bauman (1991) has linked the rise of instrumental reason to the 
horrors of the Holocaust, believing it to be a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for 
its occurrence. He states that, ‘At no point of its long and tortuous execution did the 
Holocaust come in conflict with the principles of rationality. The 'Final Solution' did 
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not clash at any stage with the rational pursuit of efficient, optimal goal-
implementation. (Bauman: 1991: p. 17). Now deeply established, instrumental reason 
forms an integral part of the dominant form of reasoning for many planners, policy-
makers and laypersons alike. This paper argues that the dominance of instrumental 
reason today, through lending itself to an increasingly hegemonic neoliberal discourse, 
undermines democratic culture and raises serious ethical concerns. It proceeds as 
follows: firstly, some background on instrumental reason and its link to policy is 
offered; next, a consideration of the marginalization of ‘deep’ green thinkers is 
presented; then, the ‘Capital’ approach to sustainability is examined; a discussion of 
Horkheimer’s ‘eclipse of reason’ and the ‘Citadel problem’ are then further presented 
to problematise proceedings; some suggestions for the future are then offered and, 
finally, some concluding thoughts. 
Instrumental reason and policy 
Instrumental reason, what Max Weber referred to as the Zweckrational, ‘…focuses on 
the most effective or efficient means for obtaining some goal or desire’ (Bishop: 2007: 
p. 90). It represents, ‘…a vision of the good life as a quest for mastery and control
devoid of deeper or wider contextual meanings…’ (Bishop: 2007: p. 93). This is often 
contrasted with Weber’s alternative rationalities: the Wertrational (behaviour guided 
by values, e.g. religious or philosophical beliefs); affective action (behaviour guided 
by emotional states); and traditional action (behaviour guided by habits and traditions) 
(Bishop: 2007: p. 38). Of course, rather than being considered as discrete, mutually 
exclusive categories, in reality there is often bleeding and overlap between the 
categories depending upon circumstance and time. Drawing on Weber, Smiley et al 
(2013) suggest that a particular combination of cultural events and forces, including 
the standardization of time, the rise of Information Communication Technologies and 
a money economy, combined and contributed to an increasing predominance of an 
instrumental form of rationality. This now forms an integral part of the ascendant 
neoliberal discourse which has become our own, current, Weberian (1904) ‘Iron 
cage’. It is important to note, however, that this ‘iron cage’ is intimately connected 
with anthropocentric Western ideals regarding the primacy of humans over nature, 
autonomy, individual rights and capital accumulation. As Bishop (2007) states, ‘The 
disguised ideologies of liberal individualism and the instrumental picture of action are 
inherent…in policy formulation and assessment because policy-makers increasingly 
use the…rational-actors picture for their work (Bishop: 2007: p. 263). In its current 
form it would be almost unintelligible and certainly unacceptable to societies which 
have traditionally placed collective interests and a more holistic appreciation of 
human-environment interactions ahead of individual rights. The issue is that this 
particular type of rationality has now been spread and institutionalised by the 
dominant social actors of our time with organizations such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank entrenching and perpetuating its logic. As a 
result, a repeated focus and emphasis on efficiency, value for money and wealth 
accumulation has come to dominate construction policy discussions at the expense of 
alternative discourses. 
With the publication of the Egan Report in 1998, following on from the start of the 
New Labour government in 1997, for example, there has been a particular emphasis 
on evidence based policy-making (EBPM). EBPM has demanded ‘efficiency’ and 
‘objectivity’ and is only interested in ‘what works’ (Parsons: 2002). Yet, an approach 
such as EBPM, with its use of targets, key performance indicators and disseminations 
of best practice, focuses on and privileges an instrumental version of rationality, what 
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Max Weber referred to as the Zweckrational, and arguably assumes, ‘…an abstract, 
uncontentious, universal knowledge’ (Michael and Brown: 2010: p. 11). The problem 
with any such attempts to turn to a positivistic stance is that it obscures the nuances 
and complexities of policy formulation as it is actually conducted. A more appropriate 
approach, perhaps, would be the Laswellian approach to policy-making and diffusion 
which suggests that policy is shaped by, ‘…power inequalities and recognised that 
knowledge is utterly embedded in power and value contexts and relationships’ 
(Parsons: 2002: p. 54). From this perspective, context matters and consensus cannot 
be assumed. For example, in the context of debates surrounding construction reform, 
who decides on what an ‘appropriate’ target is, what ‘best practice’ constitutes and 
how, why and when such a strategy should be adopted? There are also challenging 
questions such as, ‘…whether intensity of feeling should be considered as well as the 
number of persons preferring each alternative (Lindblom: 1959: p. 82). Is policy to be 
formulated through giving each actor an equal voice or should the cries of a passionate 
and vocal minority outweigh those of an apathetic majority? These are not easy 
questions. Furthermore, how do we decide the most ‘efficient’ way to arrive at a given 
goal? The privileging of efficiency itself rests on a fundamental philosophical 
assumption regarding its desirability. And, as Stone (2002) suggests, even if we accept 
efficiency as a desirable characteristic, ‘…technical efficiency does not tell you where 
to go, only that you should arrive there with the least possible effort (Stone: 2002: p. 
61). For different individuals and groups will have differing visions of what an 
appropriate reform is and what constitutes an appropriate direction. Contrary to the 
EBPM approach then, such questions and perspectives help to reveal that the 
processes of policy formulation and diffusion should be considered as inter-subjective 
rather than objective. Policy is thus better understood as a continual negotiation 
between social actors with varying values, goals and ambitions. More accurately, 
policy is defined by the dominant values which have come to be institutionalised in a 
society and what is often actioned upon is solely the desires and values of those in 
institutional positions of authority. But alternative voices, pockets of resistance to the 
dominant discourse, do exist and it is illuminating to consider one next. 
The exclusion of ‘deep’ greens 
That an instrumental rationality obfuscates policy formulation and undermines 
democratic culture is seen more clearly by considering Sorrell’s (2001) critique of the 
reform agenda as inadequate in response to climate change and issues of 
environmental sustainability. He states, ‘While these reforms have the potential to 
address many of the barriers, the reform agenda makes practically no reference to 
sustainability or to energy efficiency’ (Sorrell: 2001: p. 1). He makes a powerful point 
in that many previous and current reports recommending change and reform in 
construction have offered little mention of environmental sustainability, certainly not 
for its own, intrinsic sake at least. Rather, the rhetoric of sustainability is used to 
maintain existing social norms and order. But Sorrell (2001) is by no means alone in 
questioning the reform agenda response to issues of environmental concern. Rees 
(1999, 2009), du Plessis and Cole (2011), du Plessis (2012), have all offered extended 
critiques of the construction industry’s attempts at reform and sustainability. Though 
the construction sector has moved towards adopting more environmentally responsible 
behaviour (see Morton: 2008), it has arguably not been enough. It has certainly not 
been sufficient to appease those ecologists who conceptualise a fundamental change in 
the built environment in response to perceived environmental threats and impending 
global catastrophe brought on by climate change. There are, for example, ‘deep’ 
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greens: thinkers and activists, such as Gerzan (2005), who fundamentally reject the 
super ideology of industrialism and who urge for a reimagining of the relationship 
between humans and the environment. Their vision is one informed by a profound 
lack of anthropocentric reasoning and a deep and abiding respect for nature. It is 
decidedly eco-centric as opposed to anthropocentric. The problem, as Purnell and 
Freeman (2012) tease out, is that the prevailing discourse of the time, in this case a 
neoliberalism informed by instrumental reason, drowns out alternative voices such as 
this. Its, 
‘…closed-normative core compartmentalizes and protects its underlying narrative 
from a true exchange of ideas. The closed-core thus shuts down the potential for any 
revision of managerial narratives before a conversation even begins. In some cases 
the closed-normative core might be a wilful rejection of new ideas. In other cases…the 
notion of closed narrative core represents an unconscious blind spot that eventually 
become a destructive force’ (Purnell and Freeman: 2012: p. 114).  
It is destructive as, whether a result of ‘wilful rejection’ or an ‘unconscious blind 
spot’, policy thus continues down an increasingly homogenous path. Constituencies 
with voices which do not fit the already existing predominant narrative(s) are often 
unheard, marginalised and excluded, if they are heard at all. Opportunities and 
potential for the flexible revision and adaptation of policy is thus limited. This has 
important implications as, ‘…policies that fail to…represent interests and that 
confuse, deceive, or disempower citizens do not serve democracy’ (Schneider and 
Ingram: 1993: p. 345). Even if one disagrees with those green thinkers regarding the 
potential seriousness of environmental concerns, there is still arguably an ethical 
responsibility in a democratic society to allow their views to be heard and considered 
fully. This is because unless we assume that power and dominance confers rights, then 
ethically, the alternative is to recognise the intrinsic worth and equality of disparate 
voices. Yet this is a voice which is often ignored and marginalised. There are 
seemingly no seats at the policy table for ‘deep’ greens. But what of a more moderate 
approach? It is to this that we now turn. 
The capital approach to sustainability 
Atkinson (2008), in an approach indicative of instrumental and anthropocentric 
reasoning, advocates the use of a ‘Capital Approach’ to conceptualising the built 
environment and argues that this is particularly appropriate in order to tackle issues of 
sustainability. The Capital Approach (popularised by Pearce: 2003) suggests that the 
present wealth and assets of a nation (broadly conceived), and how they are managed, 
will have an impact on the stock of wealth for future generations (Atkinson: 2008). It 
is therefore important to consider issues of capital as matters concerning the built 
environment, which can endure across generations, are, ‘…influenced by the 
dominance of capitalism…’ (Ball: 1988: p. 43). However, not made explicit by 
Atkinson is that the capital approach appears to rest on a more fundamental 
assumption: namely, that the accumulation of wealth and assets, however broadly 
conceived, is a derisible end in itself and constitutes a particular vision of the ‘good 
life’. No mention is made as to how this specific, materialist vision came about, nor 
why it persists at the expense of other, non-materialistic or more communal visions of 
society, whose narratives do not chime with the already established ‘closed-normative 
core’ (Purnell and Freeman: 2012). This is typical of policy informed by instrumental 
reason which, ‘…neglects conflict and disagreement on ends…taking as given the 
values of dominant stakeholders’ (Sanderson: 1999: p. 329). Atkinson goes on to 
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suggest that, ‘…current changes in wealth must also have consequences for future 
well-being. It is plausible, then, that a decline in wealth will now lead to falls in future 
levels of well-being – such an economy would not be sustainable…’ (Atkinson: 2008: 
p. 242). Whilst, this is, of course, true to an extent, it does leave a series of questions
to which Atkinson gives only the briefest of mentions. Firstly, how are we to conceive 
of wealth and assets? Who gets to decide? And what is to be included and excluded in 
policy formulation as wealth and assets, and for what reason? For example, are we to 
include elements of the natural world, such as forests, streams, lakes and mountains? 
Atkinson would say yes. Yet, those members of the ‘deep’ greens mentioned 
previously might have something to say about that. They would argue that such 
natural assets are of a different kind, ones that should be respected for having intrinsic 
value, and as such, should be treated as ends in themselves rather than means. The 
view of natural elements as wealth and assets to be considered resources which should 
be shared and passed on across generations rests on an anthropocentric vision, one 
which prioritizes human flourishing ahead of others. From this perspective, the 
incommensurability of ‘shallow’ environmental concerns, underpinned by both 
anthropocentric and instrumental reasoning, and ‘deep’ environmental concerns, 
informed by an eco-centric and holistic logic, becomes more apparent. This is contrary 
then to Atkinson’s statement that, ‘…there is likely to be far more complementarities 
between the two approaches than is commonly given credit’ (Atkinson: 2008: p. 243).  
Atkinson also makes no mention of power, coercion and agenda-setting in the debate 
surrounding wealth and assets. Following on from Lukes (1974), one can conceive 
that actors who already possess the majority of wealth and assets at a given point of 
time (whether individuals or corporate entities) would have a vested interest in 
maintaining such wealth, and this would arguably extend across time to their kin in a 
future generation, thus maintaining and institutionalising inequalities across time. To 
ensure this, measures ranging from outright coercion to agenda-setting and 
‘greenwashing’ could be employed and others have already pointed out the, 
‘…ceremonial ways that organizations can signal deep greening without actually 
engaging substantively in it’ (Jermier and Forbes in Alvesson and Wilmott [eds] 
(2003): p. 171). From this perspective, significant possessors of wealth and assets may 
provide just enough lip-service to a cause to ensure that their own position and status 
is maintained, without any genuine commitment to the underlying aims (see, for 
example, Ness: 2010). Such actions serve as rhetorical devices which marginalise and 
exclude dissenting opinions, thus denying sincere conversation in the service of 
dominant interests. This has important consequences in an allegedly democratic 
society such as the UK, as, ‘…corporations and their executives can act…as a 
powerful force that undermines democratic accountability in modern Western society: 
the technocracy of management subverts the democracy of citizens’ (Alvesson and 
Wilmott: 2003: p. 12). Atkinson also neglects to mention the systematic 
marginalization of certain groups from wealth and assets, for example, the unequal 
holdings of white and ethnic members, or of men and women across society. Unless 
we are to sustain inequalities across generations, such questions would seem to be of 
great ethical importance.  
The Capital approach, then, rests on an anthropocentric and instrumental rational view 
of the world. Though presented as a beacon of hope to the sustainability movement, it 
is based on a narrow normative conception of how things ‘ought’ to be, with the 
environment considered solely a means for human flourishing. The potential for 
policy formulated by an eco-centric logic, one in which humans and the rest of nature 
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are equals in a majestic and holistic tapestry, is not considered. Rhetorical shields 
suggesting that such an approach is ‘unrealistic’ or ‘impractical’ merely act as 
disingenuous agents, knowingly or not, for the status quo. 
The eclipse of reason and the Citadel problem 
Horkheimer (1957), following Weber, was distinctly critical of the predominance of 
instrumental reason in modern life and its tendency to obscure potential alternatives 
through its hegemonic position. For Horkheimer this was the moment when the 
metaphorical moon blocked out the sun: the eclipse of reason. In a now classic essay, 
he states, in opposition to received wisdom, that, 
‘Mastery of nature has not brought man to self-realisation; on the contrary, the status 
quo continues to exert its objective compulsion. The factors in the contemporary 
situation - population growth, a technology that is becoming fully automated, the 
centralization of economic and therefore political power, the increased rationality of 
the individual as a result of his work in industry - are inflicting upon life a degree of 
organization and manipulation that leaves the individual only enough spontaneity to 
launch himself onto the path prescribed to him’ (Horkheimer: 1957: p. 4). 
It is the latter part of this quotation which is of particular relevance to our discussion. 
Policy making has come to be dictated by individuals with limited potentials for 
possible actions and only enough freedom to, ‘…launch…onto the path prescribed…’ 
(ibid). Imaginations are constrained by the particular cultural zeitgeist in which they 
exist and thus reflect the dominant discourse of the day. In the current era, this is an 
anthropocentric vision of life supported by an instrumental rationality, the 
combination of which has led in recent decades to the emergence of an increasingly 
hegemonic neoliberal discourse. This is where the eclipse occurs, the move to a 
supposedly more rational approach, through its increasingly hegemonic discourse, 
comes to form a new prejudice, excluding potential alternatives. In doing so, it 
becomes ever more irrational itself as it lays claim to a level of certainty and ‘truth’ 
which cannot be proven or assumed. This contributes to the ‘technocratic 
totalitarianism’ in the construction sector, as suggested by Green (1998), with 
continuing discursive emphasis on ‘efficiency’, ‘value for money’ and ‘productivity’. 
It must be stated, though, that it is a mostly unreflexive form of totalitarianism, in 
which many dominant actors uncritically parrot discursive tropes regarding 
construction ‘improvements’. 
What the discussion perhaps so far points to is, as Downey and Dumit (1997) suggest, 
a ‘Citadel Problem’. By this it is meant that the predominant discourse of our times, 
underpinned by Liberal foundational assumptions (including the primacy of the 
individual, the right to one’s own labour, and the right to private property), has 
positioned itself as the repository of supposedly legitimate knowledge in the modern 
world, at the expense of other alternative, competing lay knowledges. It resists 
perceived attempts to penetrate its boundaries, fortifying its position. Thus, what we 
are witnessing is an ongoing clash of cultural boundaries (Downey and Dumit: 2007). 
By unproblematically ascribing the concept of ‘facts’, a demarcation and delimiting of 
‘acceptable’ knowledge occurs. The privileging of certain information as ‘factual’ is 
important as, ‘Whether or not something is called a fact makes a great deal of 
difference to us. Statements that begin, “The fact of the matter is…” lay claim to an 
important source of authority’ (Downey and Dumit: 1997: p. 6). This has important 
consequences, and, 
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‘…one effect is to inscribe a boundary between those who achieve the authority to 
speak new truths and those who become card-carrying listeners. Claims to knowledge 
that fall inside a citadel can gain status, privilege…Claims that fall outside may have 
to struggle in a nether world of questionable legitimacy…’(Downey and Dumit: 1997: 
p. 6).
What is problematic and which raises ethical concern is that not all citadels are able to 
defend themselves equally. Institutional structures privilege certain forms more than 
others. In this instance, instrumental reason in its neoliberal guise has become 
predominant over alternatives and institutional barriers entrench this position and 
make resistance increasingly harder. The implication for policy lies in the 
consciousness and preferences of those in institutional positions of authority 
encroaching on an ever homogenous territory. The ‘Policy-maker’, in Marcuse’s 
(1964) terms, has increasingly become a ‘One-Dimensional Man’, with the 
metaphorical veil of instrumental reason obscuring their vision. Not only are voices 
outside the citadel consciously ignored but often unconsciously, as policymakers 
genuinely see no ‘real’ alternative voices to consider. The concerns of ‘deep’ greens 
and other social groups, wishing for a fundamental reconfiguration of the relationship 
between humans, the built environment and the wider natural environment, are not 
considered then. 
Where do we go, from here? 
We have come to recognise, then, the potential for a singular, dominant conception of 
rationality to obscure our vision, and so, the need for a more reflexive, collaborative, 
democratic, and pluralistic approach is arguably appropriate as a remedy. Recognising 
the instrumental picture of action not as ‘objective’ but as one of many potential 
value-laden cultural ideals allows the possibility of us opening up the ‘closed-
normative core’ (Purnell and Freeman: 2012). In terms of construction policy, this 
offers the potential to include a much broader spectrum of stakeholders in policy 
formulation. There are, however, barriers to reimagining practice, as the foundational 
atomistic assumptions regarding the primacy of the individual and private property 
rights are deeply engrained in our cultural psyches. A move towards the new model 
offered by Stilgoe et al (2006) in the table below would, perhaps, offer a more ethical, 
balanced approach though: 
Table 1: Recreated from Stilgoe et al: 2006: p. 69 
So, when planning decisions are being made, for example, as wide a variety of 
stakeholders as possible would be included and their voices and concerns given equal 
time and consideration. Policymakers would be open and honest, humble enough to 
take seriously suggestions from the public, and there would be institutional 
Old Model of Expertise New Model of Expertise 
Closed 
Homogenous 
Hubristic 
Demanding public trust 
Expecting expert consensus and
prescription 
Managerial control 
Open 
Diverse 
Humble 
Trusting the public 
Expecting plural and conditional
advice 
Distributed control 
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mechanisms in place that dispersed power and responsibility across the spectrum of 
stakeholders. This is important as, ‘Citizen participation and deliberation on issues 
that have bearing on people’s everyday lives are regarded as the normative core of 
democracy’ (Bäckstrand: 2004: p. 33). Such a model challenges current 
preconceptions but would arguably offer a more ethical way forward, allowing a 
platform for the often voiceless underprivileged to be heard. This is important as, 
‘…their needs command the same ethical status as those of the more powerful 
members of society (Etzioni: 1968: p. 494). If we take, as an example, a hypothetical 
plan for a new public park, a new model approach would canvass and take the ideas of 
local residents seriously; they would be integral to each and every stage of the 
decision-making process. There would be trust in the public. If this is difficult for 
some to accept, it is only because they have come to accept the privileging of one 
citadel of knowledge over another. Critical readers who take issue with this or believe 
it to be ‘utopian’ may wish to pause to reflect on the origins and structures influential 
in their own normative and value assumptions. Why, for example, should the opinion 
of one or two planners, with perhaps a few years’ experience after their doctorates (if 
that), trump the collective will and wisdom of residents living in the area for years? As 
Bäckstrand states, ‘…people should be able to deliberate on issues that affect their 
lives…those who bear the consequences of decisions should be able to have a say’ 
(Bäckstrand: 2004: p. 33). This would represent an active, genuine and sincere form of 
participatory democracy rather than the representative form so common today which 
is never far from a creep into a soft form of despotism, serving the dominant and often 
unreflexive interests of the day. 
CONCLUSION 
It has been suggested, then, that the predominance of an instrumental form of 
rationality undermines democratic culture and, in doing so, impoverishes policy 
formulation and potentials. The Capital approach to sustainability arguably 
perpetuates, and is informed by, a narrow conception of sustainability, one informed 
by an instrumental rationality. This is seen clearly when considering the juxtaposition 
between the Capital approach and the vision of sustainability popular with ‘deep’ 
greens. It is hoped that by raising awareness of the predominance of one particular 
type of rationality, that potential alternatives will be made visible and more pluralistic 
discussions possible. This is important as, ‘…taken-for-granted paradigms constrain 
the range of policies that policy makers are likely to consider’ (Campbell: 2002: p. 
23). This arguably represents a more ethical and democratic way forward. Most 
importantly, however, and to return to the title of this paper, we must beware 
instrumental reason masquerading as truth. That is not necessarily meant to suggest 
that it is false but, rather, that it is one truth of many, now representing the dominant 
Citadel of ‘legitimate’ knowledge in the current era. There is a need, however, in a 
supposedly democratic culture to take seriously the diverse range of voices ever 
present in a population and to ensure that each and every voice is heard, not solely the 
dominant elites. Now that we are aware, now that the veil has been lifted and we can 
begin to see more clearly, the choice is ours. 
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